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FAIRNESS, STEWARDSHIP, AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
Chr~~pherB.Barrett

ABSTRACT

The welfare economic concept of fairness offers an attractive, axiomatic foundation for the
popular notion of stewardship. Fairness emphasizes the ex ante equal standing of all persons,
across and within generations. This highlights the inextricability of poverty alleviation and
environmental sustainability, especially in the agrarian tropics where biodiversity loss,
deforestation, and desertification are growing global concerns.

FAIRNESS, STEWARDSHIP, AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT*

Stewardship is an unorthodox concept to economists, yet it is central to the welfare
economics of sustainable development. The unorthodoxy of the concept of stewardship stems
from its subordination of alienable property rights, which are central to market-based valuation
and to neoclassical economic concepts of efficiency. Yet when one sets aside the concept of

ownership for that of stewardship, an intuitive concept of sustainability emerges, one more
consistent with the intergenerational and intragenerational equity on which sustainable
development depends than is the traditional property rights perspective of neoclassical
economics. Moreover, the concept of stewardship highlights the issues of interpersonal and
transnational coordination that we, as scientists and as citizens, must solve to advance sustainable
development.
Allow me a brief digression to situate my viewpoint. I am an economist with primary
research interests in agricultural development and rural poverty alleviation in low-income
societies, especially those of sub-Saharan Africa. Thus the environmental issues of greatest
concern to me are those of peasant farmers: human overexploitation of renewable forest, soil,
water, and wildlife resources. I do not deny the importance of CO 2 emissions, toxic waste
disposal, acid rain, the exhaustion of nonrenewable fuels and minerals, or other serious
environmental concerns largely specific to the rich world. I just have little to contribute to
discussions of those topics and so concentrate on the issues about which I perhaps have some
comparative advantage. I am also a Christian, a characteristic central to my normative view of
the world. A Christian ethic and a professional background in agricultural development combine

*Prepared for presentation at the Global Stewardship Conference of the Coalition for Christian Colleges and
Universities, hosted by the Au Sable Institute of Environmental Studies in Mancelona, Michigan, and funded by the
Pew Charitable Trusts.

to stimulate my view of sustainable development as an issue of stewardship that highlights the
primacy of intergenerational and intragenerational equity.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section I highlight the important
distinction between stewardship and alienable property rights in the analysis of sustainable
development. This is followed by a discussion of principles of welfare economics, in particular
the concept of fairness as a complement to efficiency. I then highlight the interconnectedness of
poverty alleviation and environmentally sustainable development before concluding with some
of the vexing issues of operationalizing the concepts of stewardship and fairness in a world
tainted by original sin.

Stewardship and Renewable Resources

What do I mean by "stewardship"? Dictionary definitions center on "the careful and
responsible management of something entrusted to one's care" (Merriam-Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary, Tenth Edition, 1993). Under stewardship one has the right to enjoy the fruits of
creation, but is enjoined from destruction or disposal. Stewardship thus conveys only
usufructure rights, not the full set of alienable property rights to which we westerners are
accustomed. Stewardship associates responsibilities for care with the rights of harvest. I
Stewardship is surely an acceptable concept to a Christian, and to most other religious
traditions as well. Theologically, creation is not "ours" in the sense of alienable rights of

1 Although some might see an overlap between the concepts of common property and
stewardship, they are quite distinct notions. Most fundamentally, common property belongs to
all present; stewarded property belongs to no one present.
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ownership but solely in the sense of stewardship (De Witt). The ideology of stewardship is
equally commonplace in the traditional, polytheistic religious practices of many poor agrarian
societies, as an enormous ethnographic literature attests. So even though stewardship may be an
uncommon formal principle in modem economics, it is familiar in the spirituality of most
peoples.
As applied to renewable resources, such as forests, soils, water and wildlife, the
responsibilities of stewardship prohibit excessive use leading to irreversible depletion or
destruction. In this context, excessive use is that beyond the resource's naturally given
regeneration rate. A central problem in environmental economics is that the gains of excessive
use are enjoyed privately while the costs are borne more broadly. Conversely, the (opportunity)
costs of resource conservation are borne privately while the gains are enjoyed globally.
Economists use the term externalities to describe divergent accrual of benefits and costs, such as
from renewable resource exploitation and conservation. Externalities generate socially
undesirable inefficiencies and have thus been the subject of a vast literature.
Economists' views on externalities have been heavily influenced by the work of Nobel
Laureate Ronald Coase. Coase's theorem states that externalities do not give rise to a
misallocation of resources provided there are no transactions costs and that alienable property
rights are well defined and enforceable. Under such conditions the producers and consumers of
an externality have an incentive to negotiate a mutually beneficial trade, i.e., to internalize the
externality. Furthermore, the externality will be resolved identically no matter who holds the
property rights in the resource. This theorem fuels environmental economists' present obsession
with alienable property rights, as manifest in immense global efforts at land titling, the rise of
-3-

tradeable pollution permits, water rights, grazing rights, fishing rights, etc.
Among the many problems with Coase's celebrated theorem, the most serious for our
purposes is the illusion of a world without transactions costs. Externality problems due to
overexploitation of renewable resources - e.g., biodiversity loss, deforestation, desertification,
groundwater contamination, soil erosion - transcend national boundaries and generations. It is
generally quite costly and difficult to negotiate cross-culturally and usually impossible to do so
with persons not yet or no longer living. So property rights or no, the transboundary and
trans generation effects of overexploitation cannot be internalized through market exchange no
matter the potential gross gains from trade. Arguments for alienable property rights are thus a
siren's call that draws us off course in the search for a sustainable development path. I return to
this point in the next section.
It is not usufructure rights but stewardship constraints that need emphasis. Alienable

property rights appeal to many because they permit efficient unilateral action. But the
trans boundary and transgenerational nature of environmental problems renders unilateral
measures suboptimal. Multilateral mechanisms combining carrots and sticks are necessary to
ensure sustainability. Here the emerging economics literature on penal codes (Abreu)2 and
mechanism design (Maskin; Moore; Palfrey and Srivastava)3 show tremendous promise,

2 The literature on penal codes indicates that the only way to maintain a cooperative
equilibrium is through the credible threat by all that transgressors will be punished, and not only
by injured parties.
3 Mechanism design concerns the elicitation of individual preferences and performances
that are not publicly observable, so as to achieve socially desirable outcomes that will not occur
in the absence of coordination.
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although applications to environmental economics remain in their infancy (Batabyal). The
challenge of sustainable use of renewable resources is one of coordination among spatially and
temporally dispersed peoples living under potentially radically different living conditions.
In defining stewardship at the outset of this section I took care not to focus on environmental
resources too quickly, as is customary in the literature on sustainable development. Human life
is a central, glorious part of creation, at least as much as the earth's forests, soils, water and
wildlife. I claim that if one accepts the principal of stewardship as applied to nature, one must
logically and spiritually accept its application to humankind as well. While we are free to enjoy
the fruits of human inventiveness and labor, we are simultaneously enjoined from irreversibly
damaging life. Note that damage can be due to inactivity as much as to infliction; indeed the
former is presently the greatest threat globally.
Herein lies the core challenge of sustainable development. Overexploitation of renewable
resources in poor agrarian societies occurs in large measure because of peoples' day-in, day-out
struggle to preserve human life and that struggle is intensified by resource degradation. Poverty
alleviation and environmental sustainability are inextricably linked. We cannot be good stewards
of the planet without practicing stewardship of its people, and vice versa. Unfortunately, the
J

inhabitants of much of the agrarian tropics are ill-equipped economically and politically,
although not morally or spiritually, to serve as stewards to both humankind and nature. Ifwe
who are so equipped wish to preserve the environment of the agrarian tropics, we must enable
locals to expand their stewardship activities, as most agrarian cultures are wont.

A Welfare Economic Perspective on Sustainable Development
-5-

One prominent text defines "welfare economics" as "an investigation of methods of obtaining
a social ordering over alternative possible states of the world" (Boadway and Bruce, p.l,
emphasis in original). Welfare economics is all about the ranking of different allocations of
resources across people differently situated in space and time. Thus it is the natural subdiscipline
of economics through which to investigate questions of sustainable development. Whenever one
attempts to rank different feasible social states, value judgements are implicit. Economists try to
adhere to a standard of normative analysis based on explicitly stated ethical criteria, since there is
no uniquely, universally preferable criterion. 4 Welfare economics provides those normative tools
to the economics discipline. Below I spell out normative criteria which are entirely, perhaps
uniquely consistent with Christian ethics, and which lead directly to my claim of the
inextricability of intergenerational and intragenerational equity in sustainable development.
"Sustainable development" typically focuses on intergenerational equity in the distribution of
gains from development activities. The Brundtland Commission report, for example, defmed
sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED, p.43). An
ethic of sustainability constrains contemporary decision-makers' use of renewable resources so as
,

to ensure that future generations have the resources necessary to replicate the standards of living
we can enjoy now. Sustainability is thus a very specific area of welfare economics concerning
the ethics of intergenerational welfare.

This disciplinary standard of explicitness in valuation methods is a major reason other
social scientists deride economists, for we open ourselves to attack by broadcasting inherently
disputable value systems. Unfortunately, that derision has feedback effects, and the classic
approach to normative economics is becoming more rare.
4
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Economists follow a strong, perhaps excessive tradition of methodological individualism
(Arrow). Thus we proclaim as Pareto efficient any social position from which it is impossible to
make even one person better off by altering patterns of exchange or production without making
someone else worse off. Pareto efficiency is the core of most welfare economic inquiry,
especially within the neoclassical tradition currently dominant within the discipline. Indeed,
economists are often reluctant to step beyond the Pareto principle in normative analysis.
Unfortunately, Pareto efficiency is severely limiting in that it really only identifies a social
possibility frontier mapped over the space of all individuals, present and future. It offers no
criterion by which to choose a finite number of points, much less a unique social solution, from
that infinite locus.
Economists customarily identify a unique, efficient social allocation by assuming a full set of
alienable property rights over all scarce resources and no transactions costs (sound familiar?),
and then exploiting heterogeneous individual interests and the nonsatiation of individual desires
to exhaust all potential Pareto improving exchanges. Thus all competitive market equilibria are
Pareto efficient and vice versa under the first and second theorems of welfare economics.
Recognize, however, that if all resources are owned by the present generation (and we
presently have no practical means to convey ownership to unborn generations), Pareto efficiency
dictates the overexploitation, even the exhaustion (depending on assumptions about marginal
costs and benefits of exploitation) of renewable resources. 5 The Coasian, alienable property

Even with bequest motives, a perfect intertemporal competitive equilibrium does not
lead to sustainability (Asheim). To get around this conclusion, one has to invoke altruism. This
may yet prove a fruitful path, but it remains quite underdeveloped in economics.
5
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rights approach to environmental economics is thus inherently insufficient for, perhaps even
incompatible with sustainability. The concept of stewardship, on the other hand, ensures
intergenerational equity by construction and does not do violence to the reality of nontrivial
transactions costs in economic exchange across continents and centuries.
In the absence of a complete set of alienable property rights, Pareto efficiency again yields an
infinite set of socially acceptable distributions. Fortunately, there are paths to restrict attention to
a subset of Pareto efficient points. One of the most promising paths is the concept ofjairness,
which embodies the biblical principles of compassion by employing as its equilibrium concept
the absence of envy (Rawls; Feldman and Kirman;Varian; Pazner; Thomson; Baumol; Chavas).6
A fairness criterion treats all persons equally, although it does not dictate an equal division of
resources. Different people are endowed with different abilities and preferences. Envy in this
formulation indicates not only that one would prefer another's consumption choice set but also
that one would be willing to produce the other's output, given own abilities. Envy is thus the
willingness to exchange circumstances with another, holding natural endowments constant.
Two implications emerge from the fairness criterion as a complement to Pareto optimality.
First, fairness is entirely consistent with the constraints imposed by the concept of stewardship.
If future generations would envy our standard of living, then we must transfer to them a larger
stock of natural or manmade capital, i.e., we must invest more and consume less. Fairness
imposes a responsibility not to overexploit renewable resources. Conversely, if we anticipate
envying future generations' standards of living, we should make fuller use of our usufructure

To be more precise, I rely on "fairness-equivalence," a refinement due to Pazner that
ensures the existence of at least one allocation that is both Pareto efficient and fair( -equivalent).
6
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rights to the fruits of the earth. 7
It is important to distinguish between conservation and preservation. Stewardship does not

mandate preservation, defined as maintenance of nature in an unaltered state. It does impose a
standard of conservation, which requires safeguarding the total stock of resources. Nobel
Laureate Robert Solow (p.IS) writes, "a sustainable path for the economy is thus not necessarily
one that conserves every single thing or any single thing. It is one that replaces whatever it takes
from its inherited natural and produced endowment, its material and intellectual endowment.
What matters is not the particular form that the replacement takes, but only its capacity to
produce the things that posterity will enjoy. Those depletion and investment decisions are the
proper focus." The next section considers the microeconomics of depletion and investment
decisions and how they can be influenced by the fairness principle.
The second implication concerns the interpersonal division of the benefits and costs of
stewardship. Chavas and Coggins demonstrate that a fair-equivalent and Pareto efficient
allocation leads to a maximin criterion defined in terms of individual ex-ante willingness to pay.
If individuals' preferences are heterogeneous then they benefit differentially from public goods
and should pay disproportionately for the cost of providing public goods. Environmental
sustainability has important public goods characteristics. Use below resources' naturally-given
regenerative rate is nonrival, and the benefits of a sustainable resource path are both
nonexcludable and nonrival.

7 Note that distributional fairness is an ex ante concept. Precautionary savings in the face
of uncertainty and downside risk suggest that standards of living will not be identical across
generations ex post. Indeed, precautionary savings suggests standards of living will trend
upward over time.
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The notion that benefits and costs accrue disproportionately suggests a central place for
transfers. These can occur within or across generations. The mass of studies of individuals'
demand for environmental quality show that wealthy persons place greater monetary value on
environmental amenities and quality than do the poor, so there should be disproportionately large
contributions from the relatively wealthy in contemporary society toward the pursuit of
sustainability. Furthermore, assuming continued technological progress, future generations will
be richer than we if given the same endowment of resources. This suggests future generations
will place even greater value on environmental amenities. Thus they de facto transfer to the
present generation nonrenewable resources that can be replaced by synthetics.
The fairness criterion permits us to focus on a finite, perhaps even unique, Pareto efficient
social equilibrium that holds across space and time. Surely this is the objective of sustainable
development. Moreover, fairness suggest some actionable remedies to what appear to be
unsustainable present patterns of renewable resource use.

The Interconnectedness of Poverty Alleviation and Sustainable Development
One of the central claims of this paper is that greater intragenerational equity is central to
intergenerational equity, thus that stewardship for the environment is inextricably linked to
stewardship for the poor. This conclusion stems partly from the environmentally destructive
responses of agricultural populations to poverty. Alleviation of the poverty persistently infecting
the agrarian tropics promises endogenous, positive effects on the environment by relieving
pressure on renewable resources. This clearly benefits future generations, who depend on the
present generation's bequests. It also benefits the wealthy in contemporary society, who as a
- 10 -

group evince high non-use valuation of environmental amenities, attributable chiefly to the high
income elasticity of demand for environmental quality (Ruttan; Antle and Heidebrink).8 As the
World Bank (p. 1) asserts, "there are strong 'win-win' opportunities that remain unexploited. The
most important of these relates to poverty reduction; not only is attacking poverty a moral
imperative, but it is also essential for environmental stewardship."
Discussions about sustainability, such as Solow's quote in the previous section, frequently
focus on the intergenerational implications of present decisions regarding resource depletion and
investment. Two fundamental laws of economics are that investment equals savings and that the
marginal propensity to save increases with income. That is, the wealthy can and do save more
than the poor. Just as the wealthy value environmental quality more than the poor, so do the
wealthy have greater ability to invest in environmental protection. Thus if we wish to invest in
resource conservation and restoration in the tropics, where the threats of biodiversity loss,
deforestation, desertification, etc. appear especially great, we must identify and employ some
means to apply the savings of today's wealthy to conservation in the neighborhood of today's
poor.
There are two ways to do this: (i) direct investment in environmental conservation and (ii)
transfers to the poor to facilitate conservation through development. The past decade or two has
witnessed unprecedented growth in the former method, with vast sums now flowing to
environmentally-oriented nongovernmental organizations. Many international conservation
groups are making notable progress in stemming the depletion of forests, soils, water and

The income elasticity of demand measures the percent change in demand relative to a
one percent change in income. It measures the slope of the expansion path of demand.
8
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wildlife in the tropics. Some attempt simultaneously to attend to the tangible development needs
of poor communities on the periphery of protected areas, often through integrated conservationdevelopment projects (ICDPs), which have attracted hundreds of millions of dollars in funding in

the past decade (Barrett and Arcese).
But even given rapidly increasing international flows of funds for conservation efforts,
environmental protection in most of the tropics involves considerable foregone present income
for local populations. For instance, Kenya alone sacrifices an estimated $200 million annually,
or 2.8 percent of GDP to conserve biodiversity through protected parks, forests and nature
reserves, the benefits from which accrue globally. Norton-Griffiths and Southey (pp.136-137)
argue, I1the global benefits from Kenya's conservation efforts are certainly worth the cost, but the
fact that so much of the cost is born by Kenya is quite inappropriate .... If the developed world
expects a country like Kenya to maintain conservation estate on its behalf, then it must be
prepared to contribute substantially toward these costs until such time as Kenya can afford to
carry the burden itself." Their estimates are buttressed by survey data showing that Kenyans
living in close proximity to parks overwhelmingly express negative attitudes toward protected
areas and believe such lands should be de gazetted for agricultural production (Akama, Lant and
Burnett). Despite their own reverence for nature, many Africans see environmentalism as the
21 st century face of colonialism, in which their homes are to be relegated to botanical gardens
and zoos for the benefit of wealthy foreigners. The distribution of the benefits and costs of
conservation is central to direct efforts at environmental conservation, and the present
distribution is surely unsustainable.
Note, moreover, that direct investment in environmental conservation and restoration is only
- 12 -

partly consistent with the fairness criterion; it attends only to intergenerational distribution
issues. Furthermore, despite their present popularity, ICDPs are not yet analytically or
empirically sound approaches. They proceed from untested biological and economic
assumptions, many of \vhich are likely to prove false (Barrett and Arcese). Prohibitions against
resource overexploitation are futile in the face of persistent, dire poverty, as the massive failure
of the traditional "fences and fines" approach to wildlife conservation around the world clearly
demonstrates (Barrett and Arcese). A starving peasant will voluntarily chance illegal poaching if
he has no other recourse to find protein for his family. The current flurry of direct environmental
investment is both financially and ethically incomplete, and is likely ultimately ineffective in
stemming resource overexploitation in the agrarian tropics.
While direct investment by high-income nations in tropical environmental conservation has
boomed, indirect investment through transfers to the poor is lagging, even declining for many
parts of the world, particularly sub-Saharan Africa. Government-to-government foreign aid is
under attack, in the US Congress and many northern governments, and for some good reasons.
However, pessimism surrounding the efficacy of bilateral official aid in relieving poverty in the
agrarian tropics is poisoning the atmosphere for development assistance more generally. This
must be recognized and challenged as a serious threat to sustainability.
A growing literature finds poverty alleviation induces endogenous behavioral changes in
fertility, cropping patterns, energy use, etc., with considerable positive effects on the
environment (Perrings; World Bank; Karshenas). These changes advance the welfare of both
the present rich, because of their positive non-use valuation of environmental amenities and
quality, and future generations, due to a larger stock of bequeathed resources. The inter- and
- 13 -

intra-generational welfare frontier thus expands as poverty alleviation reduces the negative
externalities of resource overexploitation. Let's consider a few examples of the mechanisms by
which these feedback effects occur.
Most poor people in the agrarian tropics depend heavily on the natural resource base for their
livelihood. As Karshenas (p. 743) puts it, "their man-made capital stock is meagre and
technologically they are well behind the advanced countries. They suffer from massive
unemployment and underemployment of labour, which is more the result of a shortage of manmade capital and complementary resources than a cyclical phenomenon or one related to high
rates of automation. Environmental degradation in many instances is related to economic
backwardness and slow economic growth rather than being a matter of a growing economy
pressing against the limits of the natural resource base." In the absence of alternative means of
subsistence, stewardship for human life depends directly on natural resource exploitation.
Many environmental economists point to irreversibility and temporal uncertainty as
generating quasi-option value in favor of environmental conservation (Arrow and Fisher; Fisher
and Hanemann). However, when one admits the irreversibility of death and the inherent
uncertainty of crop yields, food prices, wages, employment and the other means of survival in the
agrarian tropics, it becomes clear that irreversibility and uncertainty also produce environmental
degradation. 9

9 A subtle but important point concerns the hierarchy of knowledge about irreversibilities.
Miracles not withstanding, we know for certain the irreversibility of human death. We know a
great deal, albeit with somewhat less certainty, about the irreversible developmental damage
caused by childhood malnutrition and morbidity. We know still less about the degree to which
environmental calamities are irreversible, simply because ecosystem dynamics have not been
studied as long and carefully as human health or mortality.
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Stewardship for human life too often conflicts with stewardship for renewable environmental
resources in the agrarian tropics. Food insecurity induces agricultural extensification on
unsuitable terrain (e.g., steeply-sloped, erosion prone hillsides or rainforest floors with minimal
subsurface nutrient content), discourages adoption of new, land-conserving and land-augmenting
technologies and induces shortened fallowing cycles in swidden cultivation regimes. It also
generates high discount rates, \0 by decreasing life expectancy and increasing the probability of
death due to accident, illness or starvation at any given point in time.
The threat of irreversible destruction, of human life or renewable resources, and the
uncertainty of such events point toward adoption of a "safe minimum standards" approach
(Bishop 1978, 1993) which considers the benefits of development relative to the benefits of
conservation. The problem, of course, is that we remain quite ignorant of the benefits and costs
of either. What is more, we still know the least about the places in which we have the greatest
humanitarian and environmental concerns. Economic and environmental data from the lowincome world remains thin in both quality and quantity. Remedyirig this shortage must be an
area of primary emphasis for contemporary scientists.
Where the natural resource base of the agrarian tropics once could carry its dependent human
populations while still regenerating itself, this is no longer the case in much of the world. The
nonstationary process of human food, fuel, fiber and water demand is overtaking the stationary
process of natural resource regeneration. It is tempting to thus focus on population policy as

10 An unusually high discount rate indicates that poor peopl~ tend to discount future
benefits more than do wealthy people, thereby discouraging self-interested resource
conservation.
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central to stemming resource overexploitation, but this thinking is largely misguided.
First, we know there exists a strong negative relationship between women's total fertility
rates and their incomes, and at a societalleve1 between population growth rates and the growth
rate of per capita income. Children are (i) a source of valuable labor in agrarian societies
characterized by seasonal labor shortages, even if the average panseasonal unemployment rate is
quite high, (ii) a means of diversifying household income risk through off-farm labor, whether
locally or through migration, and (iii) a quasi-pension in economies lacking capital markets for
retirement investment or government- or firm-funded pensions (remember smallholders are selfemployed).
Second, population growth is not inconsistent with environmental conservation and recovery,
as a detailed recent study of Machakos District in Kenya indicates (Tiffen, Mortimore and
Gichuki). It is not the rate of population growth per se so much as its interaction with an
inequitable distribution of land and other productive assets and access to working capital that
forces human colonization of the forest, depletion of soils, and predation of wildlife. Note that
labor shortages are aggravated by environmental destruction. As desertification and
deforestation move water and wood sources, respectively, farther from the homestead, it takes
more time to gather necessary materials. There is thus a destructive spiral as environmental
degradation increases the demand for labor time and thus for children, which in tum further
stresses the environment. Indeed, I hypothesize that the positive association between population
growth and environmental deterioration is attributable chiefly to their joint causation by
structural determinants of poverty, although this is not a claim I can support empirically at
present. This is an important reason why population control efforts have generally proved
- 16 -

unsuccessful among poor agrarian populations in the absence of severe state controls (e.g.,
mainland China).
Poverty is both cause and consequence of environmental degradation (Perrings; World Bank;
Karshenas). It is important therefore to search for fundamental exogenous causes of poverty.
Chief amongst these are, as already suggested, insufficient man-made capital, appropriate
technologies and employment opportunities. These are the arenas in which rich-to-poor
transfers, whether in the form of charitable contributions, foreign aid or foreign investment, can
most usefully address the inextricable problems of rural poverty and unsustainable patterns of
resource use.
What might residents of high-income nations do? Food production and distribution systems
in the agrarian tropics are especially key issues. Roughly half the world's poor, or more than half
a billion people, live in environmentally fragile rural areas (World ~ank) and rely almost entirely
on natural resources for day-to-day survival. Quantum leaps in crop production technologies and
massive investment in rural communications, financial and transportation networks in the 1960s
and 1970s relieved agriculture-based environmental pressures in much of Asia. Unfortunately,
the Green Revolution had far less impact in Latin America and effectively bypassed the entirety
of the African continent. Indeed, now we are discovering to our astonishment that a sizable
proportion of food producers in African countries are net purchasers of the very crops they
cultivate (Weber et al.; Barrett and Dorosh). Microecbnomic behavior, in response to changing
incomes, prices or risk exposure, varies enormously depending upon whether one is a net buyer
or net seller of a product. The large proportion of the world's small farmers unable to selfprovision in food haven't land enough, given the production technologies accessible to them, or
- 17 -

they haven't appropriate technologies, given their land endowments. The more appropriate of
these two ways to view the problem depends on the scope for social remediation.
In a place like Madagascar, where less than five percent of cultivated land is held by farms of
ten or more hectares but perhaps two-thirds of Malagasy rice fanning households buy more rice
than they sell, land redistribution is unlikely to accomplish much. In such places the problems of
farmers' failure to be food self-sufficient are multifaceted. Chief among these are insufficient
availability of yield-increasing, risk-reducing production technologies, anemic rural financial
systems that fail to provide credit for purchased modem inputs or to insure against temporary
calamity, and underdeveloped marketing systems on which peasants cannot depend for
affordable food during the pre-harvest hungry season nor for timely crop evacuation and
remunerative prices post-harvest. The developed world, largely through philanthropic
foundations, invested heavily in these areas a generation ago, but interest and funding are waning
today despite mounting evidence that revitalizing local research, extension, finance and
marketing systems is key to placing much of low-income agriculture on a sustainable
development path. 11
Meanwhile, in a place like Panama a highly inequitable, bimodal land distribution prevails,
)

and large mean farm sizes suggest room for considerable land redistribution from large to small

Most empirical evidence continues to point to very high marginal rates of return to
agricultural research. For example, Byerlee and Traxler estimate a 37-48% internal rate of return
to international wheat improvement research. Despite these high returns, real international
agricultural research, budgets are falling, in some cases quite rapidly.
II
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farms to turn all into net sellers. 12 Yet although the United States government has been willing to
commit several hundred million dollars to the invasion and occupation of Panama to depose an
uncivil political leader, we have been unwilling to commit a fraction of those financial and
political resources to redressing the gross imbalances that continue to disfigure Panama's social
fabric, its economy and its lovely forests and hillsides. Conjunctural moments of dramatic social
change are uncommon opportunities for necessary land reform efforts in places like Panama,
Haiti, and South Africa.
Upland shifting fallow cultivation patterns in Africa are breaking down, largely due to rates
of technological advancement insufficient to overcome population pressures toward the
parcelization of land and the expansion of cultivation to marginal lands, at great cost in terms of
soil exhaustion, deforestation and loss of biodiversity. At the same time, lowland cultivation has
not expanded sufficiently to take the pressures off fragile uplands. For instance, of the 40 million
cultivable hectares of inland valleys in west and central Africa, only about 8 percent are
cultivated. Water, disease and pest management are key obstacles to sustainable inland valley
development that might take pressure off the rapidly degrading highlands. But little concerted
effort has been made in this direction. Even after tsetse fly eradication in some east African
valleys, populations have remained reluctant to occupy the land permanently because of water
control problems, bilharzia and schistosomiasis.

12 Using FAO census data from the 1980s, I estimate average farm size in Madagascar at
1.20 hectares with a Gini coefficient of .408. Panama, by contrast had an average farm size of
14.74 hectares and a Gini coefficient of .844. A hectare is approximately 2'li acres. A Gini
coefficient is an index of equality, with a lower bound of zero (perfect equality) and an upper
bound of one (perfect inequality).
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Household energy use is another area requiring concerted development efforts to advance
environmental stewardship. The poor of the agrarian tropics rely heavily on biomass sources e.g., fuelwood, charcoal, straw and dung - for cooking and heating. These are inefficient
energy sources and can have significant adverse health effects, through indoor smoke inhalation,
as well as environmental effects through deforestation and failure to replenish soil nutrients
through organic fertilization. Yet only quite recently have western .scientists turned attention
toward providing more fuel-efficient, cleaner-burning stoves and cost-effective, micro-level
hydroelectric and solar power sources. Household energy use has become especially problematic
during prolonged economic decline in Africa because biomass fuels are an inferior good,
meaning demand for them increases as people's incomes decrease. This follows from the greater
expense of more efficient, cleaner-burning fuels (e.g., electricity, kerosene) and the working
capital constraints faced by cash-starved rural folk with direct access to biomass fuel sources.
Another area warranting attention is the immigration laws of wealthy countries. There is
perhaps no clearer behavioral expression of envy than migration, which reveals the migrant's
preference to apply his skills in another land to enj oy the fruits available from labor in the host
setting. Prohibitions against immigration for economic reasons are clear violations of the
principle of fairness. Moreover, immigration restrictions impede sustainable use of renewable
resources by restricting the capacity of poor populations to move to areas where there is less
pressure on the land. Liberal immigration laws facilitate the flow of people from overpopulated
ecosystems to underpopulated ones. Driving through the vast uninhabited tracts of Utah that
surround my home I have no doubt that population pressures threatening tropical forests and the
endemic species therein could easily be released and the living standards of many impoverished
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peoples improved by voluntary (not forced) migration without overtaxing Utah land managers.
Finally, social chasms, within poor countries as well as between rich and poor countries,
contribute enormously to environmental problems. Highly uneven growth patterns, as in Brazil
or the Philippines, lead to colonization of marginal lands and unusually rapid rates of
environmental degradation. Closing social chasms is not just a matter of top-down transfers but
instead of community empowerment. Where communities have been given authority and
responsibility to define the problems they face, and the financial and technical resources
necessary to address these and evaluate the resulting efforts, great progress is often made. The
CAMPFIRE schemes in Zimbabwe (Barrett and Arcese) and the Iringa projects of Tanzania
(Barrett and Csete) attest to this. Poverty alleviation and socio-political empowerment of the
disenfranchised majority of most low-income societies is central to the project of sustainable
development. As Boyce (p.6) succinctly argues, "all else equal, greater inequalities of power and
wealth lead to more environmental degradation." Contemporary efforts to improve the
accountability of governments to their constituents and innovations in participatory development
project design, implementation and evaluation show promise and deserve reinforcement by
western technocrats (World Bank).

Conclusions

A fairer world is a more sustainable world. We need to relieve the food security pressures
that rationally induce smallholders to overexploit forests, soils, water and wildlife. Supply side
pressures on the environment are largely the rational, endogenous responses of an impoverished
population growing in both absolute and relative terms. High total fertility rates leading to
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dangerously high human population growth rates, low rates of adoption of environment-friendly
technologies, inefficient energy use based on fuelwood and charcoal, and wildlife predation
through poaching and habitat encroachment are substantially by-products of the rural poor's
desperate attempts to survive. Their commendable stewardship for human life, including the
survival of their heirs, conflicts fundamentally with stewardship for the renewable resources on
which future generations descendent from all peoples will depend. We must do more -

notably

through advances in food production and distribution systems, improved household energy
sources, liberalized immigration laws, and increased local participation in policy and project
formulation -

to empower the poor of the agrarian tropics. Direct investment by foreign elites

in environmental conservation in the agrarian tropics does not hold much promise, either
ethically or practically.
Even if we successfully combat rural poverty, serious obstacles' nonetheless remain.
Stewardship implies that the rightful "owner" of resources must be able to exercise control over
the distribution of usufructure rights and the enforcement of stewardship responsibilities.
Although the faithful may unanimously endorse the concept of stewardship of God's creation, the
idea is difficult in the real world. Except in a handful of theocracies, God's word is not public
and law, but must be perceived, interpreted and acted upon individually. Trust in governments
(perhaps especially modem theocracies) to act in the interests of all persons within and across
generations has ebbed and will likely remain low for some time. Nor are there credible
supranational environmental authorities, despite the launching of the Global Environmental
Facility (GEF) within the World Bank and the existence of the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP). There are thus substantial coordination problems involved in implementing
- 22-

the concept of stewardship.
The coordination problem is one to which economists, especially those working in the game
theoretic arena of mechanism design, are increasingly turning. Transnational coordination is
necessary to resolve the inextricable problems of environmental sustainability and poverty
alleviation. In seeking ways to advance the objective of sustainable development, we must seek
to develop and strengthen mechanisms for redistribution within and across generations.
Sustainability is ultimately a question of resource distribution.
Improved coordination mechanisms are equally necessary at the local level. The design of
institutions that can overcome free rider and moral hazard problems through community-level
organizations for joint investment in land improvements (e.g., contouring, bunding, ridging,
terracing), afforestation, political action, and crop marketing is a growing focus in development
circles. Successful examples of community banking schemes (e.g., the Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh) suggest this is a feasible goal in the coming decade or two.
Overcoming the poverty and sociopolitical marginalization of rural populations of the
agrarian tropics remains a daunting task for contemporary society, just as does the establishment
and maintenance of sustainable resource use patterns. These tasks are inextricably linked in the
/

development of poor agrarian societies. Stewardship for nature cannot proceed in the absence of
stewardship for our fellow humans, both are imperative if we are to seek a fair and efficient
world.
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STEWARDSHIP AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Stewardship is an unorthodox concept to economists, yet it is central to the welfare
economics of sustainable development. The unorthodoxy of the concept of stewardship stems
from its subordination of alienable property rights, which are central to market-based valuation
and to neoclassical economic concepts of efficiency. Yet when one sets aside the concept of
ownership for that of stewardship, an intuitive concept of sustainability emerges, one more

consistent with the intergenerational and intragenerational equity on which sustainable
development depends than is the traditional property rights perspective of neoclassical
economics. Moreover, the concept of stewardship highlights the issues of interpersonal and
transnational coordination that we, as scientists and as citizens, must solve to advance sustainable
development.
Allow me a brief digression to situate my viewpoint. I am an economist with primary
research interests in agricultural development and rural poverty alleviation in low-income
societies, especially those of sub-Saharan Africa. Thus the environmental issues of greatest
concern to me are those of peasant farmers: human overexploitation of renewable forest, soil,
water and wildlife resources. I do not deny the importance of CO2" emissions, toxic waste
disposal, acid rain, the exhaustion of nonrenewable fuels and minerals, or other serious
environmental concerns largely specific to the rich world. I just have little to contribute to
discussions of those topics and so concentrate on the issues about which I perhaps have some
comparative advantage. I am also a Christian, a characteristic central to my normative view of
the world. A Christian ethic and a professional background in agricultural development combine
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